SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
ATKINS v. VIRGINIA
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
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No. 00—8452. Argued February 20, 2002–Decided June 20, 2002
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Petitioner Atkins was convicted of capital murder and related
crimes by a Virginia jury and sentenced to death. Affirming, the
Virginia Supreme Court relied on Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,
in rejecting Atkins’ contention that he could not be sentenced
to death because he is mentally retarded.
Held: Executions of mentally retarded criminals are “cruel and
unusual punishments” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Pp.
5—17.
(a) A punishment is “excessive,” and therefore prohibited by the
Amendment, if it is not graduated and proportioned to the
offense. E.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367. An
excessiveness claim is judged by currently prevailing standards
of decency. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100—101.
Proportionality review under such evolving standards should be
informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent,
see, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000, the
clearest and most reliable of which is the legislation enacted
by the country’s legislatures, Penry, 492 U.S., at 331. In
addition to objective evidence, the Constitution contemplates
that this Court will bring its own judgment to bear by asking
whether there is reason to agree or disagree with the judgment
reached by the citizenry and its legislators, e.g., Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597. Pp. 5—8.
(b) Much has changed since Penry’s conclusion that the two state
statutes then existing that prohibited such executions, even
when added to the 14 States that had rejected capital punishment
completely, did not provide sufficient evidence of a consensus.
492 U.S., at 334. Subsequently, a significant number of States
have concluded that death is not a suitable punishment for a
mentally retarded criminal, and similar bills have passed at
least one house in other States. It is not so much the number of
these States that is significant, but the consistency of the
direction of change. Given that anticrime legislation is far
more popular than legislation protecting violent criminals, the
large number of States prohibiting the execution of mentally
retarded persons (and the complete absence of legislation
reinstating such executions) provides powerful evidence that
today society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically
less culpable than the average criminal. The evidence carries
even greater force when it is noted that the legislatures
addressing the issue have voted overwhelmingly in favor of the
prohibition. Moreover, even in States allowing the execution of
mentally retarded offenders, the practice is uncommon. Pp. 8—12.
(c) An independent evaluation of the issue reveals no reason for
the Court to disagree with the legislative consensus. Clinical
definitions of mental retardation require not only subaverage
intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations in
adaptive skills. Mentally retarded persons frequently know the
difference between right and wrong and are competent to stand
trial, but, by definition, they have diminished capacities to
understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract
from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical
reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand others’
reactions. Their deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from
criminal sanctions, but diminish their personal culpability. In
light of these deficiencies, the Court’s death penalty
jurisprudence provides two reasons to agree with the legislative
consensus. First, there is a serious question whether either
justification underpinning the death penalty–retribution and
deterrence of capital crimes–applies to mentally retarded
offenders. As to retribution, the severity of the appropriate
punishment necessarily depends on the offender’s culpability. If
the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to
justify imposition of death, see Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S.
420, 433, the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded
offender surely does not merit that form of retribution. As to
deterrence, the same cognitive and behavioral impairments that
make mentally retarded defendants less morally culpable also
make it less likely that they can process the information of the
possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a result, control
their conduct based upon that information. Nor will exempting
the mentally retarded from execution lessen the death penalty’s
deterrent effect with respect to offenders who are not mentally
retarded. Second, mentally retarded defendants in the aggregate
face a special risk of wrongful execution because of the
possibility that they will unwittingly confess to crimes they
did not commit, their lesser ability to give their counsel
meaningful assistance, and the facts that they are typically
poor witnesses and that their demeanor may create an unwarranted
impression of lack of remorse for their crimes. Pp. 12—17.
260 Va. 375, 534 S. E. 2d 312, reversed and remanded.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined.
Rehnquist, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia
and Thomas, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Thomas, J., joined.
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